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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Murthys sought damages for injuries that chapter 489,
Florida's construction contracting statute, was enacted to prevent, the court
had to decide whether the Legislature intended the statute's expressed
penalties and disciplinary enforcement provisions to be exclusive.' Because
implied recovery or denial is attributable to the legislation, not to the court's
independent policy choice,2 the Murthys' claim stands or falls with the
statute under which it was asserted: chapter 489.3 Still in the devastating
aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,4 consumers such as the Murthys do not
1. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
2. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
3. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
4. See generally Alan T. Dimond, Hurricane Andrew: From Devastation and Chaos to
Rebirth and Renewal, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1003, 1003-07 (1993) (describing the hurricane and
its effect on South Florida).
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care that the Construction Industry Licensing Board5 ("CILB") may
discipline and penalize incompetent and unscrupulous contractors under the
statute.' It may be "cold comfort" to them that the wrongdoer will be
disciplined if the discipline excludes liability for damages to injured
consumers.7 The courts should not presume that legislative silence implies
such a policy choice.'
The series of cases discussed in this comment debate the existence,
within chapter 489, of an implicit private right of action against qualifying
agents.9  Conflicting interpretations of the statute prompted the Third
District Court of Appeal to request resolution from the Florida Supreme
Court."° Accordingly, in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., the Third District
Court of Appeal noted the conflict of its decision and the Finkle v.
Mayerchak" decision with the decisions from the First and Fifth Districts
and certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Does
chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1991), the licensing and regulatory chapter
governing construction contracting, create a private cause of action against
the individual qualifier for a corporation acting as a general contractor?"' 2
Upon closer examination, however, a conflict exists only between the
First and Third Districts. Specifically, the Third District Court of Appeal's
decisions in Finkle and Murthy, conflict with Gatwood v. McGee, 3 decided
by the First District Court of Appeal. In the other two cases to which the
Murthy court cites, 4 Hunt v. Department of Professional Regulation,5
and Alles v. Department of Professional Regulation,6 the First and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal held that, under chapter 489, a qualifying agent
5. FLA. STAT. § 489.107 (1991). The CILB, created within the Department of
Professional Regulation ("DPR"), enforces the provisions of chapter 489. Id.; see infra note
84.
6. See Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 854 (Or. 1981) (Linde, J.,
concurring).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309; Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
10. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
11. 578 So. 2d at 397-98.
12. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
13. 475 So. 2d at 723.
14. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
15. 444 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
16. 423 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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has a statutorily-imposed duty to supervise any construction project for
which the qualifying agent is the licensee of record.' 7
Gatwood, Hunt, and Alles served to establish the decisional law
construing the statute's legislative intent to impose a supervisory duty upon
qualifying agents. 8 By 1988, however, before Finkle and Murthy were
decided, the Legislature codified the duty to supervise in section 489.1195
of the Florida Statutes, setting standards and procedures for qualifying
agents.' 9 In other words, the statutory duty exists; the question becomes
whether the qualifying agent's breach of the duty creates a private cause of
action. Both Hunt and Alles involved contractors who appealed disciplinary
actions taken by the Department of Professional Regulation2" and thus, did
not reach the issue of creating a private cause of action against the
qualifying agents.2' While both Finkle and Murthy held the statute creates
no private cause of action against qualifying agents individually, 22 the
Finkle court cites Gatwood, contradicting itself, to support a cause of action
in common-law negligence against an individual qualifying agent.23
Moreover, the Murthy court cites Finkle with no additional explanation, so
too implying the Gatwood court's reasoning.24
Both cases misapply Gatwood, Finkle directly and Murthy indirectly,
because Gatwood implies a cause of action in negligence, under chapter 489,
against individual qualifying agents. 2' The action lies for damages resulting
from a breach of their nondelegable, statutorily-imposed supervisory duty.26
It is likely that the Third District Court construed chapter 489 to mean
it does not create a negligence per se action when a qualifying agent
breaches the supervisory duty in violation of the statute.27 In fact, by
allowing a cause of action in common-law negligence the court begs the
certified question. The more appropriate question may be whether chapter
17. 444 So. 2d at 999; 423 So. 2d at 626.
18. Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
19. FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (Supp. 1988).
20. See supra note 5.
21. See Hunt, 444 So. 2d at 997; Alles, 423 So. 2d at 625.
22. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397; Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
23. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 398.
24. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
25. See Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
26. Id.
27. See Williams v. Youngblood, 152 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(stating in dictum that an unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se, that
is, negligence as a matter of law to be ruled by the court).
1993]
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489 creates a private right of action in negligence per se, or whether its
violation is merely prima facie evidence of negligence.28
Although the Finkle court refers to the plaintiffs' negligence per se
claim,29 the court does not apply the negligence per se line of cases in its
reasoning.3" In deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, the Florida
Supreme Court set forth rules applying the negligence per se doctrine,
creating binding case law statewide.3' However, the Finkle court uses the
judicial implication doctrine from Fischer v. Metcaly2 that is binding only
in the Third District.33 In order to analyze and evaluate Murthy and the
certified question, one must understand both the Gatwood and Finkle
decisions.
Part two explains the facts and disparate decisions of Gatwood, Finkle,
and Murthy. Part three analyzes chapter 489 and applies the Third District
Court of Appeal's rationale for declining a private right of action under the
statute. The threshold analysis focuses on the judicial implication doctrine
adopted by the Third District and applies the doctrine to Murthy using
intrinsic and extrinsic aids to statutory construction to ascertain legislative
intent.
Thereafter, part three suggests and applies an alternative judicial
implication doctrine, negligence per se, not considered by either the First or
Third Districts. Part three also considers extra-jurisdictional approaches
28. See deJesusv. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973) (holding
that violations of statutes, other than those imposing a form of strict liability, may be either
negligence per se or evidence of negligence).
29. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
30. See id. at 397-98.
31. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201.
32. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc). The court
held that chapter 827, Florida Statutes (1979) does not provide a private right of action for
violation of a statutory duty to report an alleged abuse. Id. at 787.
The court adopted the more restrictive United States Supreme Court doctrine, not
binding on Florida district courts of appeal, id., instead of controlling doctrine from de Jesus.
See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201; see also Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d
182, 184 (Fla. 1983) (holding that an injured party should have an action where a statute
gives a right, even though it has not expressly given a remedy).
The Fischer case involves minor children who brought an action against their father's
psychiatrist, alleging the psychiatrist failed to report that he knew or suspected the father was
physically and emotionally abusing the children, causing their injuries. 543 So. 2d at 786.
33. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397-98. Although Fischer is controlling authority in the
Third District, and therefore binding on the Finkle court, both courts ignored the Florida
Supreme Court cases on judicial implication doctrine and negligence per se. See deJesus,281
So. 2d at 201; Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; see supra notes 28, 32.
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which, when applied to Murthy, support a private remedy under chapter 489.
Finally, part four discusses the likely ramifications of a private right of
action against qualifying agents, then part five concludes that chapter 489
implicitly supports a private remedy.
II. SPLIT AMONG FLORIDA'S DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
A. Gatwood v. McGee
Prior to 1979, Gatwood Enterprises, a home construction business,
entered into an agreement with Glynquest, a third party builder, whereby
Glynquest was employed to manage and supervise Gatwood Enterprises'
home building operation. 4 Gatwood, a building contractor, was Gatwood
Enterprises" president, sole stockholder and qualifying agent." Gatwood,
although involved in various aspects of Gatwood Enterprises' operations,
had nothing to do with the actual construction of the homes.36 He did,
however, obtain the building permit for the home sold to the McGees in
October 1979. 3" Within two months after the McGees bought and occu-
pied the new home, they discovered that it had been constructed on a bed
of muck, ten to twelve feet deep, which had been covered with a layer of
fill sand." The unstable ground caused substantial structural problems to
the home.39
The McGees filed suit in August 1980 against Gatwood individually,
and Gatwood Enterprises, Inc., a dissolved corporation since June 1980.40
The trial court entered judgment for damages against the corporation and
Gatwood individually. 41 Only Gatwood, individually, appealed the judg-
ment.42
The First District Court of Appeal held that Gatwood had a statutorily-
imposed duty, as qualifying agent, to supervise construction pursuant to
chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1979). 4' The court further held that breach-
34. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 721.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 722.
38. Id.
39. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 722.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at '723.
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ing the duty provides a basis for personal liability in a negligence action."
Specifically, the court stated that the "negligent performance of the
qualifying agent's statutorily imposed duty of supervision may support a
cause of action for damages . . . ."" The court added that the qualifying
agent's duty of supervision is nondelegable; 46 the qualifier may not evade
responsibility for negligent supervision by relying upon one who, even
though a competent builder, is not the qualifying agent of record for the
company pursuant to chapter 489.4' The court emphasized that the cause
of action was based upon negligence.4 ' The court further stated that to
recover, the plaintiffs must prove more than Gatwood improperly delegated
his supervisory responsibility.49 The McGees must prove that the construc-
tion defects could reasonably have been avoided if the qualifying agent
executed his statutorily-imposed duty with due care.5 °
B. Finkle v. Mayerchak
In early 1984, the Finkles met with Firestone, the owner of a construc-
tion company, MPF Enterprises, to negotiate a contract for the design and
construction of their home.5' Firestone represented to the Finkles that he
personally held a Florida general contractor's license." Firestone did not
inform the Finkles that Mayerchak was, in fact, the qualifying agent for
MPF. 3
In 1987, the Finkles sued Mayerchak individually, as MPF's qualifying
agent, alleging that the house was not completed timely, economically, or
free from defects. 4 The Finkles filed both common law negligence and
negligence per se actions.5 They claimed that Mayerchak was responsible
for their damages pursuant to chapter 489, because the building permit was
issued to him and because he allowed an unlicensed person to use his
44. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
50. Id.
51. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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license.56 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mayer-
chak on both the negligence and negligence per se claims."
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision on the negligence per se claim and held that neither section
489.119 nor 489.129 of the Florida Statutes, regulatory and penal statutes,
creates a private cause of action against Mayerchak as the individual
qualifier for a corporation acting as a general contractor.5 However, the
district court reversed the trial court's ruling on the negligence claim.5 9
Citing Gatwood, the court held that the Finkles' claim did state a cause of
action against Mayerchak for common-law negligence.60
C. MurthY v. N. Sinha Corp.
Prior to 1991, the Murthys entered into a contract with N. Sinha
Corporation, a home construction business, for improvements to their
home.6 Sinha was the president, sole stockholder, and qualifying agent
for the corporation.62 According to the terms of the contract, the corpora-
tion could not require payment before the completion of a pre-defined
phase, unless it was mutually agreed by both parties.63 When the corpora-
tion requested payment before completing work on Phase III, the Murthys
refused to pay until the corporation completed the Phase III work and
satisfied the county building code requirements.64 The corporation refused
to correct the defects and abandoned the project.65 The Dade County
Building and Zoning Department later cited and red-tagged the Murthys'
home for building code violations.66 Further, N. Sinha Corporation's
builders prematurely cut the overhang around the house and left it
uncovered for weeks knowing that the Murthys were living there.67 The
56. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id at 398.
60. Id.
61. Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.. 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
62. Id.
63. Initial Brief of Appellants at 2, Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01237).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
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house flooded repeatedly and the ceiling collapsed causing property damage
and personal injuries.6"
In May 1991, the corporation filed a claim of lien against the Murthys'
home.69 When the Murthys contested the lien, the corporation filed an
action for breach of contract and to foreclose on the mechanic's lien.7"
Thereafter, the Murthys filed an amended third party complaint against
Sinha, individually.7' The trial court granted the corporation's motion to
dismiss the third party complaint, and the Murthys appealed.72
Citing Finkle, the court held that neither section 489.119 nor 489.129,
the regulatory and penal statutes, respectively, of chapter 489 creates a
private cause of action against qualifying agents individually.73 Again
citing Finkle, and reversing the trial court, the district court held that the
Murthys did state a cause of action against the qualifying agent, individual-
ly, for common-law negligence.74 The court added that Sinha could not
be held personally liable under the construction contract because he was not
a party to the contract; the contract was between the Murthys and N. Sinha
Corporation.75
III. INTERPRETING FLORIDA STATUTES CHAPTER 489
A. Implying a Private Cause of Action
Chapter 489 makes no express provision for a qualifying agent's civil
liability.76 The threshold inquiry, therefore, concerns whether a cause of
action should be judicially implied. Whether to imply a private cause of
action from a statute is determined by legislative intent.77 Legislative
intent controls construction of statutes in Florida and that intent is deter-
mined primarily from the language of the statute.7" The plain meaning of
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
73. Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 308.
75. Id. at 309.
76. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991).
77. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982).
78. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982).
[Vol. 18
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 21
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/21
Ferguson
the statutory language is the first consideration.79 This principle, known
as the "plain meaning rule," requires judicial determination of statutory
ambiguity as a prerequisite for judicial interpretation.8"
Conflicting interpretations of chapter 489 among the First and Third
District Courts of Appeal evidence the statute's ambiguity." In its
inconsistent and unclear interpretation of chapter 489,82 the Third District
Court of Appeal has placed itself in direct conflict with the First District
Court of Appeal.83 Resolution of the controversy depends upon an analysis
of the rationales applied in the Third and First Districts, respectively,
together with the relevant sections of chapter 489,84 and an alternative
79. Id.
80. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879,
882 (Fla. 1983).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 11-24.
82. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309; Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
83. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J., concurring)
(failing to exercise "due care" in carrying out qualifying agent's statutorily-imposed
supervisory duty has effect of lifting protection of corporate veil and rendering qualifying
agent personally liable).
84. Florida Statutes, section 489.101 provides:
Purpose.
The Legislature recognizes that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when incompetent
or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or
services. Therefore, it is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety,
and welfare to regulate the construction industry.
FLA. STAT. § .489.101 (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.105(3) defines "contractor" as
follows:
"Contractor" means the person who is qualified for and responsible for the
entire project contracted for and means ... the person who, for compensation,
undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or by others construct, repair,
alter, remodel, add to, subtract from, or improve any building or structure,
including related improvements to real estate, for others or for resale to others
FLA. STAT. § 489.105(3) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.105(4) defines a "qualifying
agent" as follows:
"Primary qualifying agent" means a person who possesses the requisite
skill, knowledge, and experience, and has the responsibility, to supervise, direct,
manage, and control . . . construction activities on a job for which he has
obtained the building permit; and whose technical and personal qualifications
have been determined by investigation and examination as provided in this part,
as attested by the department.
FLA. STAT. § 189.105(4) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.107(l) provides in relevant
part:
1993]
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Construction Industry Licensing Board.
"To carry out the provisions of this part, there is created within the
Department of Professional Regulation the Construction Industry Licensing
Board ....
FLA. STAT. § 489.107(l) (1991). Florida Statutes, section § 489.119(2)(a) provides in
relevant part:
Business organizations; qualifying agents.
[A]pplicant[s] propos[ing] to engage in contracting as a... corporation ... or
other legal entity . . . must apply through a qualifying agent . . . . Such
application must also show that the qualifying agent is legally qualified to act
for the business organization in all matters connected with its contracting
business and that he has authority to supervise construction undertaken by such
business organization .... The registration or certification, when issued upon
application of a business organization, must be in the name of the qualifying
agent, and the name of the business organization must be noted thereon ....
FLA. STAT. § 489.11 9(2)(a) (199 1). Florida Statutes, section 489.1195(1) provides in relevant
part:
Responsibilities.
"A qualifying agent is... responsible for supervision of all operations of
the business organization; for all field work at all sites; and for financial matters,
both for the organization in general and for each specific job."
FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(1) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.129(1), (2) provides in
relevant part:
Disciplinary proceedings.
(1) The board may revoke, suspend, or deny the issuance or renewal of the
certificate or registration of a contractor, require financial restitution to a
consumer, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, place a contractor
on probation, require continuing education, asses costs associated with
investigation and prosecution, or reprimand or censure a contractor if the
contractor, or if the business organization for which the contractor is a primary
qualifying agent.., responsible under s. 489.1195, is found guilty of any of the
following acts:
(d) Willfully or deliberately disregarding and violating the applicable
building codes or laws of the state or of any municipalities or counties thereof.
(f) . . . When a certificateholder or registrant allows his certificate or
registration to be used by one or more business organizations without having any
active participation in the operations, such act constitutes prima facie evidence
of an intent to evade the provisions of this part.
(h) Committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contract-
ing that causes financial harm to a customer . ...
(in) Committing fraud or deceit or gross negligence, incompetency, or
misconduct in the practice of contracting.
[Vol. 18
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rationale not applied by any of the district courts in the context of the
certified question."
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Finkle v. Mayerchak, was the
first to hold that neither section 489.119 nor 489.129 of the Florida Statutes,
the regulatory and penal statutes governing construction contracting, creates
a private cause of action against the individual qualifier for a corporation
acting as a general contractor.86 The Finkle court relied on Fischer v.
Metcalf, looking to legislative intent rather than what it termed the "class
benefitted'" factor to determine whether the statute creates a private right of
action.87 The Finkle court found no evidence of legislative intent to create
a private remedy on behalf of individuals. 88 The Murthy court cited Finkle
without explanation to deny the plaintiffs a statutory cause of action against
the qualifying agent, 89 and to permit a common-law negligence action
against the qualifier.9" Neither court revealed its analyses of the statute,
legislative intent, or cases upon which its conclusions were based.
However, the Finkle and Murthy courts' reasoning can be reconstructed
by applying the Fischer court's rationale to Murthy. Prior to Fischer,9 the
Third District Court of Appeal applied the common-law tradition from
Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc.,92 which set forth a relatively simple test.
The test provides that, where a penal statute imposes a duty to benefit a
class of individuals, a right of action accrues to a class member injured
through breach of the duty.93 The cause of action arises by virtue of the
duty created by the statute.94
(2) If a contractor disciplined under subsection (1) is a qualifying agent
for a business organization ... the board may impose an additional administra-
tive fine not to exceed $5,000 against the business organization or any partner,
officer, director, trustee, or member if such person . . . knew or should have
known ... and failed to take reasonable corrective action.
FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1), (2) (1991).
85. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
86. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also FLA. STAT.
§§ 489.119, 489.129 (1989).
87. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
88. Id. at 398.
89. Murthy, 618 So. 2d 309.
90. Id. at 308.
91. 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
92. 168 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (adopting test originating federal
implication doctrine from Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
93. Id.; Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
94. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
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The Fischer court found the United States Supreme Court's rationale
in Cori v. Ash " compelling and adopted the Cori test while receding from
the common law tradition in Rosenberg.96 The Fischer court stated that,
in the Third District, "the 'class benefitted' factor would no longer be the
sole determinative" in implying a private right of action for violation of a
penal statute.9 7 The court set forth the United States Supreme Court
doctrine using its test to determine whether a private remedy should be
implied in a statute not expressly providing one.9" The Fischer court's
criteria focused on discerning the legislative intent behind enacting the
statute under review.99
First, the plaintiff must be one of the class for whose "especial" benefit
the statute was enacted.100 Second, a court must consider any explicit or
implicit intent to create or deny a private remedy.' Third, judicial
implication must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.' 02
The first step in applying the Fischer test to Murthy is to decide if the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was
enacted.' 3 In other words, a statute that merely makes a provision to
secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity should not be
construed as establishing civil liability. 4 However, whether the liability is
95. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Supreme Court's reluctance to imply civil liability
from federal statutes is partly because damage actions are normally a question of state law.
Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 853 (Or. 1981) (Linde, J., concurring).
Unlike Congress, however, state legislators know that judicial recognition of implicit tort
liability does not involve such jurisdictional questions. Id.
96. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 788.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(violating minimum building code is not negligence per se because purpose of statute is to
protect general public). The Rockercourt ignored section 553.84 of the building construction
standards statute which states: "any person ... damaged as a result of a violation of ... the
State Minimum Building Codes, has a cause of action in any court ... against the person or
party who committed the violation." FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1979); see also Byron G.
Petersen & Steven S. Goodman, Section 553.84: Remedy Without a Cause?, 17 NOVA L.
REV. I I 11, 1121 n.48 (1993) (noting that a violation of the building code translates into
failure to meet the minimum standards of proper construction, which is more like a
formulation of negligence per se than mere evidence of negligence).
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exclusively of a public character depends on the nature of the duty imposed
and the benefits to be derived from its performance. °5
The Legislature enacted chapter 489 to regulate the construction
industry "in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare.' °6  The
Legislature "recogniz[ed] that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when
incompetent or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived
products or services."'0 7 Although the stated purpose of chapter 489 uses
the broad term "public," the statute functions to protect consumers of
contractors' services: a specific class of persons.
Furthermore, the nature of the qualifying agent's duty is absolute
responsibility for the project.0 8 The qualifying agent must supervise all
operations of the business organization, the field work at all sites, and
financial matters of the corporation and each specific job."09 The charac-
ter of the qualifying agent's duty is private not public because a specific
consumer derives the primary benefits from its performance.
The statute defines a contractor as one who "undertakes to . . .con-
struct, repair, alter, remodel ... or improve any building or structure for
others or for resale to others . . . .""' The "others" for whom contractors
provide services are a distinct, specific group of consumers. Thus, the
statute was enacted for the "especial" benefit of the consumers of contrac-
tors' services. It follows that Murthy, a consumer who contracted for
services from a business organization acting as a contractor, N. Sinha
Corporation, is a member of the class for whom the statute was enacted."'
105. Frontier Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 101 N.W. 995, 996 (Neb. 1904). If the
duty imposed is clearly intended for the benefit of individuals or their property, the plaintiff
may recover; but where the duty imposed is plainly for the public at large, then an individual
acquires no new rights by virtue of the statute. Id. See generally 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes
§ 223 (1984) (discussing rights of action predicated on violation of statutory duty); cf Lake
v. Ramsay, 566 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that qualifying agents
have a duty to their employers and a further duty of competence and professional
responsibility to the public).
106. FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991); see supra note 84.
107. Id
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(4), 489.1195 (1991); see supra note 84.
109. FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (1991). But see ch. 93-166, § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015,
1036 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (Supp. 1992) to allow corporation to designate
"financially responsible officer," in addition to qualifying agent, responsible for all its
financial aspects).
110. FLA. STAT. § 489.105(3) (1991); see supra note 84.
111. See Mallock v. Southern Memorial Park, Inc., 561 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (implying right of action from statute based on Fischer test).
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Moreover, the Finkle court based its holding on "no evidence of...
legislative intent . . ." rather than the "class benefitted factor." '112 The
court's statement invites the reasonable inference that the plaintiff satisfied
the class benefitted factor.'" 3  Notwithstanding the court's omission, the
facts of Murthy satisfy the first requirement of the Fischer test."4
The second prong of the Fischer test requires discerning any explicit
or implicit legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy." 5 While
the statute does not expressly create a private remedy on behalf of
individuals, and the courts are under no compulsion to apply the statute, 116
the absence of an express provision for civil liability does not negate a
legislative intent that the statute will affect private rights." 7
The Finkle and Murthy courts held that there was no evidence of a
legislative intent to create a private remedy on behalf of individuals. 18
The courts did not discuss their reasoning or whether the referenced lack of
intent was explicit or implicit. Nor did they address legislative intent to
deny a private remedy on behalf of individuals. The ensuing analysis
applies rules of statutory construction to determine a legislative intent to
either create or deny a private remedy against individual qualifiers.19
First, penal statutes and highly regulatory laws are usually subject to
strict construction in favor of the violator, and should not be extended by
112. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
113. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788. The court did not specify whether the statute must
meet all three criteria to justify judicially implying a private right of action. The inference
assumes the Finkle court applied the criteria conjunctively. Id. at 792 (Baskin, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Cort directs the court to consider all relevant factors).
114. But see id. at 790 (legislating a private right of action to include so many, by
implication only, strained the court's credulity).
115. Id. at 788.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286(d) (1964).
117. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983) (holding
that an injured party should have an action where a statute gives a right, even though it has
not expressly given a remedy); see supra note 32; Girard Trust Co. v. Tampashores Dev. Co.,
117 So. 786, 787 (Fla. 1928); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv.
395, 401-06 (1950) (effecting purpose of statute justifies implementing it beyond its text).
118. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 398; Murthy v. N. Sinha. Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
119. Fleischman v. Department of Prof. Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (instructing that "[e]very statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed
to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship
between its parts.").
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interpretation. 20  A penal statute commands or prohibits acts imposing
penalties for their violations in order to enforce obedience to the law and
punish its violation.' 2 ' However, the penal character of a statute will not
prevent imposition of civil liability. 22 Moreover, the rule of strict con-
struction does not apply to those portions of a statute that are not penal.'23
Chapter 489 is penal in nature because it imposes penalties such as
fines and license revocation for most violations.124  Section 489.127
classifies a violation of subsection (1) a misdemeanor punishable according
to a cross-referenced criminal statute.1
25
However, the sections of chapter 489 within the scope of the certified
question involve the qualifying agent's positive duty to competently
supervise construction projects. 12 Moreover, section 489.129 subsection
(1) authorizes the licensing board to require the qualifying agent to pay
financial restitution to a consumer for violations under that subsection. 27
The remedial nature of this part of the statute disciplining the qualifying
agent removes it from a strictly penal category. 12  Thus, courts may
liberally interpret the statute because the rule of strict construction does not
apply here. 1
29
120. Federgo Discount Ctr. v. Department of Prof. Reg., 452 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788; Dotty v. State, 197 So. 2d 315, 318
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
121. Dotty, 197 So. 2d at 318.
122. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975); Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So.
2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club,
Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1369 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
123. Lee v. Walgreen Drugstores Co., 10 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1942).
124. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.127, 489.129, 489.132 (1991) (enumerating prohibitions,
penalties, and disciplinary proceedings of licensed and unlicensed principals); see also supra
note 84.
125. FLA. STAT. § 489.127 (1991) (referencing FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082-775.083 (1991),
for criminal penalties and fines).
126. Id. §§ 489.1195,489.129; accordViking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 770 P.2d 732, 735
n.4 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (explaining that Contractors' State Licensing Law is nonpenal in
nature because its purpose is to protect consumers not punish individuals). The court added
that the statute's nonpenal nature allows a broader 'interpretation. Id.
127. FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (1991); Boneski v. Department of Prof. Reg., 562 So. 2d
441, 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating the 1988 amendment authorizing DPR to
order financial restitution to a consumer may not be applied retroactively).
128. Collins v. Kidd, 38 F. Supp. 634, 637 (E.D. Tex. 1941) (holding that a statute
containing both penal and remedial parts should be considered penal when it is sought to
enforce the penalty, and remedial when it is sought to enforce the remedy).
129. Maloney, 770 P.2d at 735 n.4; see supra note 126.
1993]
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Second, the courts may not supply an omission that to all appearances
was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted. 3 ' To
imply a private remedy here, the court may supply the omission because the
express statutory language reveals the legislators contemplated a civil action
and inserted a provision that justifies implication.' 3' Specifically, section
489.129(1)(m) provides a penalty for "[c]ommitting fraud . . . deceit ...
gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contract-
ing."' 3 2 Notwithstanding the language in section 489.129 subsection (1),
authorizing financial restitution to a consumer, chapter 489 contains no
language explicitly creating or denying a private remedy.'33 While the
restitution clause may provide a remedy to a consumer, it does not qualify
as a private right of action because it is available only upon the DPR's
prosecution of the contractor or qualifying agent.'34
While the Legislature intended to protect the class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member, it has not manifested an intention to achieve this
protection by imposing a private right of action against qualifying agents.
130. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Motor & Compressor Co., 446 So. 2d 224, 226
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
131. Telephone interview with Wellington H. Meffert, Chief Construction Attorney,
Department of Professional Regulation, (Aug. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Meffert Interview]. Mr.
Meffert, a former contractor, and prosecutor for the DPR, was the primary drafter of the 1993
amendments to chapter 489. He contributed to the 1991 and 1992 revisions as well. Mr.
Meffert said the drafters contemplated a civil suit against qualifying agents and they
envisioned that section 489.129(l)(m) would support judicial implication; however, he will
"wait and see what the Florida Supreme Court decides, to find out [what they really
intended]." Id. See generally Robert M. Rhodes & Susan Seereiter, The Search for Intent:
Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida--- An Update, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 508-09
(1985) (noting that postenactment statements are disfavored as indicia of legislative intent).
But see Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 545 (Fla. 1982) (admitting a legislator's
affidavit as an expression of legislative intent).
132. FLA. STAT. § 489.129(l)(m) (1991); see supra note 84. In 1992, the Legislature
subdivided the provision into three parts:
(m) Committiig fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting.
(n) Being found guilty of incompetency or misconduct in the practice of
contracting.
(o) Being found guilty of gross negligence, repeated negligence, or negligence
resulting in a significant danger to life or property.
FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (Supp. 1992). In 1993, the Legislature changed the wording in
subsections (n) and (o) from "[b]eing found guilty of' to "[clommitting." Ch. 93-166, § 18,
1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1043 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (Supp. 1992)).
133. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991); see supra note 84.
134. See FLA. STAT. § 489.129(l) (1991). The "board may ... require financial
restitution to a consumer .... Id. (emphasis added).
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The only remedies involving qualifying agents that the statute provides are
disciplinary or penal proceedings.'
Admittedly, the Legislature could have conferred a private right of
action against qualifying agents who breach their statutorily-imposed duties
in the same manner as it has done in other statutes.1 3 6 In 1988, section
768.0425, formerly numbered 489.5331, was transferred from chapter 489
to chapter 768 entitled "Negligence.',3 Section 768.0425 expressly
provides civil treble damages in actions against unlicensed contractors for
injuries sustained from negligence, malfeasance, or misfeasance.
13 8
Subsequent versions of chapter 489 of the Florida Statutes, including the
1993 revisions, do not include a cross reference to the renumbered
statute. 139
Even though the statute was originally enacted as part of chapter 489,
the same legislative act, tending to support the conclusion that it is part of
a single statutory scheme, the lack of a continuing relationship indicates
otherwise. The legislators probably transferred the provision from the
contracting chapter to the negligence chapter because they intended no
private remedy against contractors within chapter 489. Because contractors
135. Id. § 489.129; see supra note 84. The qualifying agent who breaches the duty to
supervise is not subject to criminal penalty, only discipline by the CILB. FLA. STAT. §
489.129 (1991); see supra note 84. The legislators identified one remedy to benefit the
consumer directly, and according to the general statutory construction principle, expressio
unius estexclusioafterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Thayer
v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). However, it is more likely the Legislature avoided
the question because it is controversial. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789. Nevertheless, the
Restatement of Torts states:
The fact that a statute ... provides for ... the payment of a sum of money to
the injured person as a penalty [for its violation], does not in itself prevent the
imposition of tort liability through the adoption by the court of the standard of
conduct required by the legislation or regulation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 287(a) (1964).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1991) (providing private cause of action against anyone
violating minimum building codes); see also supra note 104; FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (1991)
(providing civil remedy for theft); id. § 681.11 (providing consumer remedies for violation
of motor vehicle sales warranty statutes). The preceding statutes exemplify a few, but not
all of those expressly providing private rights of action.
137. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING REGULATORY REFORM, STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT OF 1988, Section 23 at 4 (April 18, 1988)
(transferring language on damage actions by consumers against contractors to chapter 768,
Florida Statutes).
138. FLA. STAT. § 768.0425 (1991).
139. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992); ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla.
Laws 1015, 1055 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
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must be privy to a contract with a consumer under section 768.0425,14°
and qualifying agents are not usually parties to the construction contract, the
transfer indicates no deliberate legislative intent to preclude a remedy
against qualifying agents.
Third, when scrutinizing the history of legislation to determine
legislative intent, it is appropriate to consider acts passed at subsequent
sessions.'4 In addition, the courts may consider extrinsic aids to statutory
construction.142 Florida courts frequently cite committee reports to assess
legislative intent, especially staff analyses. 43
Review of the statute's history indicates the Legislature has repeatedly
amended chapter 489 since its enactment in 1979. In the most recent
revision, during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the Legislature
substantially amended chapter 489, effective July 1993. 44 While the
drafters did not add a private right of action against qualifying agents, they
reaffirmed prior legislative intent by maintaining the qualifying agent's
absolute duty to supervise each project.145 The Legislature recognized that
consumers needed more protection from incompetent and unscrupulous
contractors. 46  Legislative intent derived from committee reports, staff
analyses, staff materials and the revised text of the 1993 amended provisions
focused on more consumer protection.141
In the 1993 amendments to chapter 489, the Legislature reformed
various elements of existing provisions and added several elements designed
140. FLA. STAT. § 768.0425 (1991). The statute states: "[flor purposes of this section
only, the term 'contractor' means any person who contracts [with a consumer] to perform
any construction .... (emphasis added).
141. Watson v. Holland, 20 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 839
(1945).
142. Rhodes & Seereiter, supra note 131, at 488.
143. Id. at 495.
144. Ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1055 (amending FLA. STAT. §§
489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
145. Id. § 14 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(l)(a) (Supp. 1992)).
146. See H.R. COMM. ON BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FINAL BILL
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTRUCTION AND ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING OF 1993, at 3, Summary (Apr. 8, 1993)
[hereinafter H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM].
147. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 2-12; WELLINGTON H.
MEFFERT, DEP'T OF PROF. REG., SYNOPSIS OF CONSTRUCTION REFORM BILL CH. 93-166 AND
93-154, LAWS OF FLA. (1993); ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1055 (amending
Fla. Stat. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
[Vol. 18
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 21
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/21
Ferguson
to protect the consumer.' The revised statute establishes a recovery fund
for homeowners to recover monies lost in dealing with a licensed contrac-
tor.'49  Although the 1993 amendments do not apply to Murthy, the
Legislature acknowledges the hardships consumers such as Murthy faced
under the 1991 and 1992 versions of the statute. 50  Prior to the 1993
revisions, there was no recourse for consumers who suffered financial
damage fi'om dealing with licensed contractors if those contractors were
insolvent, "judgment proof," or had simply disappeared.' 5' If the contrac-
tors were available, the consumer could have initiated a disciplinary process
which may have penalized the consumer.15 Alternatively, the consumer
could have filed a civil suit against the contractor.153  However, in many
cases, neither the disciplinary action nor the civil suit resulted in reimburse-
ment for the consumer's losses.'54
Concededly, the Legislature has had ample opportunity to broaden the
penalty for a qualifying agent's breach of a statutory duty by adding a
companion civil remedy. However, the unchanged nature of the penalties
148. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3. Major consumer-oriented
changes included requiring state certification for all municipal or county building personnel,
revising and enhancing disciplinary measures, requiring all contractors to maintain a $10,000
surety bond, and establishing a Construction Industries Recovery Fund. In addition, local
jurisdictions that do not provide discipline must cease to issue local construction contractor
licenses. Id.
149. Ch. 93-166, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1050 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
489.140); H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, § 22, at 7.
150. See H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3.
151. Id.
152. If a consumer allowed the statute of limitations to run on a civil suit while waiting
for the DPR to complete its investigation, and the DPR decided not to prosecute [the
contractor], the consumer loses. Meffert Interview, supra note 131. Consumers encounter
other disadvantages if they file a complaint with the DPR in lieu of a civil suit. First, the
DPR must meet a higher standard of proof (clear and convincing), than the plaintiff in a civil
action (preponderance). Hence, the consumer is more likely to prevail in a civil action.
Second, the consumer is not a party to any action the DPR takes; thus, consumers relinquish
decision-making control that they would maintain in a civil action with their own attorneys.
Id.
153. The civil suit is usually on the contract, not a statutory action. See, e.g., Smith v.
Mark Coleman Constr., Inc., 594 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Moreover,
the qualifying agent is not privy to the contract therefore unreachable via an action on the
contract. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Finkle v. Mayerchak,
578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 722
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
154. HR. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3.
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in the face of repeated revisions may imply that, rather than a deliberate
omission, the legislators avoided the question because it was controversial
or they simply did not have a civil suit in mind.15
In summary, chapter 489 reveals no explicit legislative intent, using
intrinsic or extrinsic aids to statutory construction, to create or deny a
private right of action against qualifying agents.'56 However, the statute's
expressed purposes and penalties supply an implicit intent to support a
private remedy which overrides any implicit intent to deny one.' 57
Without question, the Legislature recognizes the need for and intends to
provide consumer protection against the risk of harm from incompetent and
unscrupulous contractors, including qualifying agents.'58 While the
Legislature's expressed intent is to provide that protection through regula-
tion, the court would further the general purpose of the statute by implying
a private right of action.
Finally, the third prong of the Fischer test requires that judicial
implication must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.'59 An implied civil remedy is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. The thrust of the legislation
indicates intent to protect consumers of contractors' services, of which
qualifying agents are a subset, and to discourage dishonest and incompetent
contractors from harming those who employ their services, whether by
criminal prosecution, CILB discipline or by civil lawsuit.
Chapter 489 satisfies each prong of the Fischer test. Therefore, its
application should not operate to "close the courthouse doors to litigants
seeking private redress" for violations of the qualifying agent's statutory
duty. 6 ° While the legislators may not have forecasted a situation in which
a contractual remedy would not apply,'6 ' they have supplied sufficient
155. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131; see also supra note 117.
156. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991).
157. See id.; see supra note 84.
158. FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991).
159. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
160. Id. at 789.
161. When a qualifying agent controls the project that results in the plaintiffs' injuries,
a contractual remedy does not apply. See A.R. Moyer, Inc., v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 399
(Fla. 1973). Currently, the qualifying agent is accountable to the contractor, who is bound
by the contract, and to the DPR which can discipline and penalize the qualifying agent. FLA.
STAT. §§ 489.127, 489.129 (1991). However, without judicial implication, the plaintiff is
without a private remedy against the responsible party, the qualifying agent. See id. But cf
Montgomery v. Chamberlain, 543 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
licensed contractor of record liable for implied warranty claims based on principles of agency
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specifications to provide a discernible frame of reference within which to
imply a private right of action against qualifying agents. Without ignoring
the plain purpose and language of the statute, the court should not be
reluctant to provide civil liability for an unlawful breach of a statutory duty
that the Legislature envisioned as necessary to protect unwary homeown-
ers162 and deter unscrupulous and incompetent contractors. 163
B. What Type of Action to Imply
In Florida, violation of a statute is either evidence of negligence or
negligence per se. 164 In a negligence per se action, the measure of the
legal duty is fixed by statute, so that the violation becomes conclusive
evidence of negligence, or negligence per se. 165  In a common-law
negligence action, the duty is determined by common-law principles.
166
In either case, failure to perform the duty, whether imposed by common law
or by statute, constitutes negligence.' 67
The issues of common-law negligence parallel the issues in the
negligence per se claim. Pleading a negligence per se claim differs from a
common-law negligence claim only in that the plaintiff must allege a
statutory violation. 61 More important, the primary difference between
them is how they are proved. Negligence per se results from the violation
of a statute; 169 thus, the jury must determine only whether the actor
law).
162. Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The court
stated:
The ordinary purchaser of a home is not qualified to determine when or where
a defect exists. Yet purchaser[s] make[ I the biggest ... investment [of their]
li[vesl . . . on a limited budget . . . . The careless work of contractors,
[formerly] insulated from liability, must cease or they must accept financial
responsibility for their negligence.
Id.
163. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 793 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
164. deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973).
165. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286(d) (1964).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1964). "[T]he care which the actor is
required to exercise to avoid being negligent . . . is that which a reasonable man in his
position, with his information and competence, would recognize as necessary to prevent the
act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another." Id. § 298.
167. deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1964).
168. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 729 (1989).
169. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959) (stating the court
rules negligence per se, as a matter of law); Williams v. Youngblood, 152 So. 2d 530, 532
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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committed or omitted the specific act prohibited or required. 7 ° The jury
must find common-law negligence from the evidence. 7'
The Florida Supreme Court, in deJesus, stated that not all violations of
statutes are negligence per se; for some, a violation may be only evidence
of negligence.'72 Violations of statutes, other than those imposing a form
of strict liability, may be either negligence per se or evidence of negli-
gence.' 73 The court divided statutory violations into three categories: (1)
violation of a strict liability statute designed to protect a particular class of
persons who are unable to protect themselves, constituting negligence per
se; (2) violation of a statute establishing a duty to take precautions to protect
a particular class of persons from a particular injury or type of injury, also
constituting negligence per se; and, (3) violation of any other kind of statute,
constituting mere prima facie evidence of negligence.'74
For actionable negligence per se, based on a statute other than the strict
liability type, plaintiffs must first meet the statutory purpose test on the issue
of negligence.'75 Plaintiffs must prove that they are of the class the statute
was intended to protect, that they suffered injury of the type the statute was
designed to prevent, and that the Legislature intended to create a private
liability as distinguished from one of a public character.'76 Plaintiffs also
must prove a causal connection between the statutory violation and the
injury. 177 They must establish that the conduct constituting the violation
was the cause in fact and the legal or proximate cause of the injury. 178
Plaintiffs must satisfy these tests for the defendant's statutory violation to
170. Klein, 116 So. 2d at 423. If the court deems a statutory violation negligence per
se, the plaintiff will have established a conclusive presumption of duty and breach, two of
the four elements necessary for actionable negligence. Id
171. Id. (stating that the jury weighs all four elements of negligence when a statutory
violation is held to be merely evidence of negligence). Here, the plaintiff must prove all four
elements of actionable negligence: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damage.
172. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 200-01.
173. Id. at 201.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288(b) (1964); see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
177. deiesus, 281 So. 2d at 201 (holding that in a negligence per se action, plaintiff
must still prove proximate cause).
178. Id.
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amount to negligence per se or even to be considered as evidence of
negligence in a common-law action.' 79
While a qualifying agent's violation of a statutory duty falls outside the
parameters of the strict liability category, violations are within the second
type of negligence per se category 8° because, as has been demon-
strated,' 81 the statute establishes the qualifying agent's duty to take
precautions to protect a particular class of persons (consumers of the
contractor's and qualifying agent's services) from a particular type of harm
(bodily harm, financial harm, or property damage). 2  Alternatively,
violations are at least prima facie evidence of negligence.8 3 Nevertheless,
the plaintiff still must prove proximate cause and the other elements of
actionable negligence.8 4
The Finkle and Murthy courts ignored the line of cases implying a
private cause of action in negligence per se.' 85 The Finkle court referred
to the claims as negligence per se or common-law negligence theories."8 6
However, the court did not cite to any binding case law on negligence per
se. '7 Instead, the court relied on Fischer for judicial implication doctrine
and Gatwood for common-law negligence theory.' While Finkle asserts
that the statute creates no private cause of action against the qualifying
agent, the court relied on Gatwood, the only case holding otherwise.' 89
The Finkle court cites Gatwood to support an action in common-law negli-
179. Id. (holding that contributory negligence is a defense to negligence per se if
violation is not of strict liability statute); Alford v. Meyer, 201 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. Ist Dist.
App. 1967), cert. denied, 209 So. 2d 671, 671 (Fla. 1968) (stating that negligence or
negligence per se rules apply to statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules or regulations);
see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1964) (listing situations in which
a statutory violation may be excused).
180. See supra notes 169-70 and text accompanying note 174.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
182. FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101, 489.129(1)(d), (h), (m) (1991); see supra note 84. The
statute's stated purpose to protect the "public" from "incompetent or dishonest contractors
[who] provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or services," functions effectively to
protect those who employ the contractor's services from personal injury, property damage,
and financial harm. See supra text accompanying notes 103-1I.
183. deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201.
184. Id.
185. See Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
186. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
187. See id. at 397-98.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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gence.'9 ° However, Gatwood stands for the propositions that the statute
creates a private right of action against qualifying agents, and that the cause
of action for breach of the qualifying agent's statutory duty is negli-
gence.' According to Gatwood, the plaintiff must prove the construction
defects could reasonably have been avoided if the qualifying agent
performed his statutorily-imposed supervisory duty with "due care." '192
Even though Gatwood does not mention negligence per se or the Florida
Supreme Court's test set forth in deJesus, the facts of the case fit into the
second category of negligence per se.' 93 Applied to Murthy, the plaintiffs
are members of the class the statute is intended to protect (consumers of
contractors' and qualifying agents' services) and they suffered the particular
type of harm the statute was designed to prevent (bodily harm, financial
harm and property damage). 94 Additionally, in order to prevail, the
Murthys must establish that the qualifying agent's violation of the statute
proximately caused their injuries. 95
C. Guidance from Other Jurisdictions
Authority from other jurisdictions supports extending chapter 489 to
allow a private right of action against qualifying agents. For example, in
Brown v. Transcon Lines,'96 the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized a
public policy that supported a civil action for damages for wrongful
discharge by a worker discharged for applying for such benefits.' 97 The
court explained that it was not "creating" a new cause of action based upon
a statutory violation, but was holding only that the employee had an existing
common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge. 98  The court
characterized Brown as an extension of an existing common-law cause of
action, rather than a creation of a new cause of action. 99
190. Id. at 398.
191. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 721-22; see also supra notes 169-70 and text accompanying note 174.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
195. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973).
196. 588 P.2d 1087 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
197. Id at 1094.
198. Id. at 1092-95.
199. Id. The court also used a violation of a statutory duty as the basis for finding
liability under an existing common-law cause of action for negligence per se. Id. See Davis
v. Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 587 P.2d 75, 78 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (holding that violation of
statute prohibiting sale of liquor to minors is negligence per se).
[Vol. 1 8
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 21
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/21
Ferguson
Conversely, in Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff,2°° the Supreme
Court of Oregon analyzed violations of statutory duties and when such
violations give rise to a private right of action."' The Roloff court
declined to create a private cause of action for conduct by attorneys who
violate duties imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility. °2 The
court denied recovery for damage to the attorneys' reputations or for
attorney's fees incurred in the defense of a civil action.203 However, the
court's rationale turned on the fact that there was no underlying common-
law cause of action.204
Applied to Murthy, the Roloff and Brown analyses support a private
action arising from chapter 489 because an underlying action exists at
common law. Neither Murthy, Finkle nor Gatwood conflict as to whether
a common-law cause of action against qualifying agents exists under chapter
489.205 Each case so holds. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding
Murthy are similar to those in Brown.216 In both cases three other condi-
tions are satisfied. A civil action is: 1) consistent with the legislative
provision; 2) appropriate for promoting the statute's policy; and 3) needed
to assure its effectiveness. 7
Applying the Supreme Court of Oregon's analysis to Murthy, the
Florida Supreme Court would have to recognize a private right of action
under chapter 489. A civil remedy would promote the statute's policy and
it would be consistent with legislative intent to protect consumers from
exploitation by incompetent and unscrupulous contractors. Moreover, in the
wake of Hurricane Andrew, a civil remedy is needed to assure the statute's
effectiveness.
In Colberg v. Rellinger,2°' a case factually similar to Murthy, the
Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the plaintiffs' claim against the
qualifying agent for failing to supervise the construction work on their
residence.20 9 The court rejected the claim on the basis that the statute
200. 630 P.2d 840 (Or. 1981).
201. Id. at 842-51.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 851.
204. Id.
205. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee,
475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
206. See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087, 1096 (Or. 1978).
207. See Roloff, 630 P.2d at 847.
208. 770 P.2d 346 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
209. Id. at 352.
1993]
25
Ferguson: Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp. - Does Florida's Construction Contractin
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
pertaining to the qualifier's obligations contained no language contemplating
a private cause of action for an injured party against a qualifying agent.21°
Thus, the court concluded that the Legislature intended no private right of
action against qualifying agents."' However, the court noted that the
Arizona contracting statute "may contemplate a private claim against
contractors" because the statute permits consumers to recover from the
contractors' recovery fund when they obtain a judgment against a contractor
who violates the statute.212
The Colberg analysis applied to Murthy supports the notion that a
private right of action against qualifying agents logically flows from chapter
489. The Colberg court rejects the action against qualifiers because it
assumes that statutory silence means it excludes civil recovery. 3 This
view assumes the Legislature fosters a hostile policy toward making whole
the intended beneficiaries of a statutory duty imposed for their protec-
tion.2" 4 Colberg is distinguishable from Murthy because chapter 489 does
contain language that indicates the Legislature contemplated such a private
claim.2t5 Further, the Colberg court weighs consumers' ability to recover
from the contractors' recovery fund in favor of judicially creating a private
remedy.21 6  Section 489.129 of the 1991 Florida Statutes provides a
restitutional remedy to consumers, which comports with the Colberg analysis
that the Legislature contemplated a private right of action; therefore, it
should be allowed. 7 Moreover, Florida Statutes section 489.140 creates
a Construction Industries Recovery Fund analogous to that referenced by the
Colberg court.218 Although section 489.140 was added to chapter 489 in
1993, it provides evidence that the legislators again contemplated a private
remedy. 2 9  Accordingly, applying the Colberg analysis, the Florida
Supreme Court would necessarily recognize a private right of action against
qualifying agents under chapter 489 because the statute contains both
language and remedial provisions indicating the legislators contemplated a
private action.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Colberg, 770 P.2d at 351.
214. See Roloff, 630 P.2d at 854 (Linde, J., concurring).
215. See supra text and accompanying notes 84, 127, 130-31.
216. Colberg, 770 P.2d at 352.
217. See FLA. STAT. § 489.129 (1991); see also supra notes 84, 127.
218. Seech. 93-166, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1050-52 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 489.140).
219. See id.
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In Donnelly Construction Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland,22 ° the Su-
preme Court of Arizona provided an instructive analysis supporting a
negligence action against a design professional, individually, for purely
economic loss. 22' The Donnelly court held that a negligence action may
be maintained if the plaintiffs prove that the design professional owed them
a duty, that the duty was breached, and that the breach proximately caused
an injury that resulted in damages.222 The Donnelly court stated that
design professionals have a duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence in
rendering their professional services.223 The court further concluded that
the duty extends to those with whom the design professional is in privity as
well as to those with whom he is not.
224
The Donnelly analysis applies to qualifying agents such as Sinha,
Mayerchak, and Gatwood who, like design professionals, had a duty to use
ordinary skill, care, and diligence in rendering service to the Murthys,
Finkles, and McGees, respectively. Therefore, the Donnelly decision
supports two propositions applicable to Murthy. First, a negligence action
against individual qualifying agents under chapter 489 is appropriate and
second, the action against those not in privity precludes application of the
economic loss rule.225
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE MURTHY DECISION
If the Florida Supreme Court reverses Murthy, thus agreeing that
chapter 489 supports a private right of action against qualifying agents,
Florida residents will reap five significant benefits: (1) qualifying agents
will be more likely to comply with the statute, affording consumers more
protection; (2) consumers will have a private right of action against the
culpable party; (3) consumers will be required to meet less of a burden to
establish negligence if the court rules the statutory violation is negligence
per se; (4) consumers probably would not be limited to claims of property
damage and personal injury because the economic loss rule should not
220. 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
221. See id. at 1294; accord A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla.
1973); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906(b) (1979) (stating that
compensatory damages may include compensation for harm to property which also includes
physical impairment of anything that is the subject of ownership).
222. Donnelly, 667 P.2d at 1295.
223. Id.
224. Id.; accord Graham, 285 So. 2d at 402.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 232-38.
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apply; and finally, (5) consumers may be allowed to claim exemplary
damages.
First, if qualifying agents are subject to personal liability for violating
chapter 489, they are more likely to comply with their statutorily-imposed
duties. Qualifying agents will receive a clear signal that they will be held
accountable for their negligence. Second, consumers will have a right of
action against the culpable party. A right of action against qualifying agents
comports with the basic function of tort law; that is, to "'shift the burden of
loss from the injured plaintiff to one who is at fault ... or to one who is
better able to ... prevent its occurrence."'226  Where the qualifying agent
is also a corporate officer and stockholder of the corporate entity with whom
the consumer contracts,227 a Murthy reversal would reduce contractors'
ability to evade liability for their negligence. The statute may effectively
pierce the corporate veil that heretofore has insulated them.228
Commonly, in such cases, consumers are without a remedy even when
they prevail in a civil action on the contract. 229 The corporation may be
dissolved or bankrupt. Consequently, the corporation fails to satisfy the
judgment, and the consumer loses.230 Hence, a statutory action against the
qualifying agent, the individual responsible under chapter 489, will avail
consumers of a remedy against the culpable party.
Third, if the court rules that the statutory violation is negligence per se,
consumers will have an added advantage because they will be required to
226. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1246 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for
Construction Defects: A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 935 (1989).
227. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Gatwood v. McGee,
475 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
228. A statutory remedy would function effectively to pierce the corporate veil when the
qualifying agent is also an officer of the corporation with whom the consumer contracts.
E.g., Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J.,
concurring) (stating that the statute has the effect of lifting the protection of the corporate
veil, rendering the qualifying agent personally liable). Butcf Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,
153 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1963) (holding that the corporate entity's purpose is to limit
liability and serve a business convenience). The Spencer court further stated that those who
do business in the corporate form have every right to rely on the rules of law that protect
them against personal liability. Id.
229. Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 127 (holding action against qualifying agent not barred
because prior judgment against contracting corporation not satisfied).
230. See id; see also supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
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prove only two instead of the four elements of actionable negligence.231
Fourth, if the court implies a private right of action under the statute, the
economic loss rule should not apply. 32 A consumer's action on the
contract, against the corporation, may prove fruitless if the consumer's
damage is purely economic loss without an accompanying physical injury
or property damage.233 For example, if the Finkles were not afforded a
cause of action under the statute against the qualifying agent, Mayer-
chak, they would have been remediless because the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment for MPF Enterprises, on their
contract claim.235 The court reasoned that without property damage or
personal injury, the economic loss rule precluded their remedy.236
The rationale of the economic loss rule is that parties who have
bargained for the distribution of risk should not be permitted to circumvent
their bargain after loss occurs to property that was the subject of the
231. See Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959); see also supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
232. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming
a statutory action for damages against a qualifying agent where builders constructed the home
on a bed of muck, and "unstable ground . . . caus[ed] substantial problems to [part of] ...
the home."); see also Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 126, 127 (holding that action against qualifying
agent was not barred where homeowners claimed that the builders' workmanship was inferior,
improper, unsound, and untimely completed). Contra Finkle v. MPF Enters., Inc., 618 So.
2d 307, 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming judgment for builders based on
economic loss rule where homeowners claimed their house was not completed timely,
economically, or free from defects).
233. Finkle, 618 So. 2d at 307; see also Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, 620 So. 2d
at 1248 (holding that economic loss rule applies to home purchasing); AFM Corp. v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987) (holding that for services,
there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach without personal injury
or property damage). But see Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1976)
(rejecting the argument that injury in addition to the defective product is necessary). In
Barnes, the court reasoned that when consumers are personally injured from a defect, they
recover mainly for their economic loss. Id. The court further stated:
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs the defect and suffers
an economic loss, should he fail to recover because he did not wait until he or
some member of his family fell down the stairs and broke his neck? Does the
law penalize those who are alert and prevent injury? Should it not put those
who prevent personal injury on the same level as those who fail to anticipate it?
Id.
234. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
no statutory action allowed, but then allowed one); see supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
235. Finkle, 618 So. 2d at 307.
236. Id. (citing AFMCorp., 515 So. 2d at 181); seesupra note 232-33 and accompany-
ing text.
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bargain.237 Here, the privity requirement triggering the economic loss rule
would not be satisfied,238 because no contract exists between the individual
qualifying agent and the consumer. In fact, the tort action would not flow
from a contractual breach.239 Rather, the plaintiffs would raise a fresh
question when a qualifying agent violates the statute. The economic loss
rule would "work a mischief' here, where the culpable party is not privy to
the contract but injury to third parties is reasonably foreseeable. 240 Indeed,
qualifying agents are at fault for negligence because they are responsible for
the construction work.241 Therefore, when consumers sustain foreseeable
injuries as a result of qualifying agents' statutory violations,242 a negli-
gence action under the statute would preclude application of the economic
loss rule without contravening it.
Finally, because a statutory action against the qualifying agent would
not flow from a contractual breach, exemplary damages may be allowed
over and above actual or compensatory damages. 3 The Florida Supreme
Court noted in Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n, that plaintiffs prefer tort
remedies because they often permit recovery of greater damages.244
However, the court will allow exemplary damages only as a deterrent to
others if the plaintiff proves malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, or
outrageousness of the tort.
2 45
Alternatively, two deleterious effects may result if the court recognizes
a private right of action against qualifying agents under chapter 489. First,
237. Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Shaw, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
238. See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181; A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397,
399 (Fla. 1973) (approving recovery for economic losses without personal injury or property
damage because plaintiff was not beneficiary of underlying contract). The Graham court
explained that "[p]rivity is a theoretical device ... that recognizes limitation of liability
commensurate with compensation for contractual acceptance of risk." Id. Moreover, "[sluch
liability cannot be reasonably anticipated ... when there is no privity between the parties.
... Id. at 403 (Dekle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
239. See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
240. See id.; FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.6, at 404 n.3 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining that the economic harm likely to result from negligence is finite and easily
predictable in some cases).
241. See FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(1) (1991).
242. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308; Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 127; Finkle, 578 So. 2d at
397; Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 722.
243. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
244. 620 So. 2d at 1245.
245. Rosenberg, 168 So. 2d at 680.
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the cost of litigation may propel consumer prices upward. Qualifiers may
be unwilling to risk incurring personal liability and may become scarce. In
turn, corporate contractors who remain in the market may have to purchase
additional insurance coverage to indemnify their qualifying agents, or the
qualifiers themselves may necessarily incur the expense. Consequently, the
pace of development would probably decelerate because construction costs
would accelerate; thus, consumers may bear the cost of higher priced homes.
Second, an implied private remedy under the statute would add to the
Florida courts' "ever-greater burden" of litigation.246 Notably, the Fischer
court adopted the more restrictive federal implication doctrine from Cort v.
Ash, rather than that which was controlling in Florida under deJesus or
Smith, when it confronted the issue of creating a private right of action
under a statute.247 The court adopted the more restrictive doctrine to
manage the burden of discerning legislative intent from increasingly
complex legislation and to contain the growing volume of litigation.248
In striking a balance between the positive and potentially negative
effects of creating a private remedy, the scales tip to ensure the intended
beneficiaries of the legislation, the consumers, the full measure of protection
their needs may warrant.249
V. CONCLUSION
We live in a society which values every person's right to pursue a
grievance in court.2  Our jurisprudence rests on the principle that absent
compelling, countervailing public policies, a remedy exists for every
wrong.25" ' Chapter 489 clearly imposes a duty upon qualifying agents to
perform their statutory obligations with due care. 2  Therefore, the statute
confers by implication every particular power necessary to insure the
performance of that duty; 253 viz. the power to pursue a private right of
246. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
247. Id. at 789 (adopting doctrine from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
248. See id at 788-89.
249. See id. at 789.
250. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 851 (Or. 1981).
251. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Holland ex. rel. Williams v. Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709, 710
(Fla. 1944); Casa Clara Condominium, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
252. See FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (1991); see also supra note 84.
253. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983).
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action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 254  Although the Legislature
did not explicitly provide for a civil action, that is not determinative.255
Moreover, the Legislature has explicitly recognized consumer hardship at the
hands of incompetent and dishonest contractors. 56 In fact, the Florida
lawmakers have systematically manifested their intent to provide more
consumer protection each time they revised the statute, most notably with
the victims of Hurricane Andrew in mind, in the 1993 amendments. 57 In
the face of legislative faltering or uncertainty, the court should not relinquish
its task of judicial implication.258 To do so the court would sacrifice a
balance.
Mindful of the pitfalls of loose legislative drafting, Justice Frankfurter
once told a story in which one legislator said to his colleagues, "I admit this
new bill is too complicated to understand. We'll just have to pass it to find
out what it means." '259 Similarly, when the Florida Supreme Court decides
Murthy and answers the certified question, so too will the Florida legislators
know what chapter 489 means.
2 60
Gail E. Ferguson
254. See id at 184 n.I. Contra Wilson C. Barnes & Larry R. Leiby, The Role of the
Qualifying Agent in a Corporate Structure, 45 (1993) (available at Florida International
University, Dep't of Constr. Mgmt.) (recommending that Legislature add language stating no
private right of action is created by failure to perform statutory duties under chapter 489).
255. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; accord Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 806 P.2d 59, 62 (N.M.
1991) (determining legislative intent requires looking not only to the language of the statute,
but also to the object sought to be accomplished and the wrong to be remedied).
256. See supra text and accompanying notes 147-54.
257. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131. George Stuart assumed responsibility for
the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, formerly called the Department of
Professional Regulation, in January 1991. According to Mr. Meffert, Secretary Stuart
undertook a mission to reorient the Department from a "peer group regulatory agency" to a
"consumer regulatory agency." The consumer-focused changes to chapter 489 reflect the new
mission. In fact, Hurricane Andrew was a "catalyst" for those changes. Id.
258. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789.
259. Rhodes & Seereiter, supra note 131, at 514 (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 545 (1947)).
260. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131.
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